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Def. Doc. # 613-A (1)

Revised
Revised
Excerpts from the Interrogation of MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

7 March 1946

- Q. In March 1941 what was the nature of the conversation or visit that you had with Ambassador Steinhart in Moscow?
- A. I think it was when Steinhart gave me a luncheon in the Embassy. After lunch -- of course it was between ourselves as I said in a book -- your President was the biggest gambler in the States. Laughingly, you know. Now, won't he gamble with Japan just once and if he says that he can't trust Japan won't he trust me just once and tell China to negotiate directly with Japan? I will do just another fair thing for China, and I asked him to send those words to Washington.

Def. Doc. # 613-A (2)

Repeted

Excerpts from the Interrogation of MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

11 March 1946

~~Q.~~ What did you agree upon with the Fuehrer and von Ribbentrop at these meetings held in Berlin?

- A. In Berlin the first time I called on Hitler, he immediately broached the Singapore question, and by way of joking and bluff, I said like Japan would take Singapore before she allied herself with Germany, but saying that was a joke. In conclusion I said but as a matter of fact that question that is whether -- I am talking to you the sense of the thing -- whether Japan would take Singapore or when she would take Shingapore, that must be left to Japan alone to decide. Whereupon Hitler saw the point, you know, that I meant by saying that that it was included in Greater East Asia, and Germany had nothing to do with it. Whereupon Hitler dropped the question and never referred to it again, and von Ribbentrop on that occasion said nothing in the presence of Hitler and the rest of them and the time was devoted largely to the describing by Hitler of war conditions in Europe, particularly western Europe. With Hitler or von Ribbentrop I never discussed about the possibility of war with America.

Def. Doc. # 613 A (3)

Reputed
Excerpts from the Interrogation of MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

12 March 1946

- Q. Now, did Admiral Nomura go to the U.S. as ambassador during your term of office as Foreign Minister?
- A. I asked him and for three months he refused, but I insisted because I thought he was best man to go out to Washington.
- Q. And was he still there when you left office in July of 1941?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Why did you consider Admiral Nomura the best suited person to deal in these matters?
- A. I know him to be a friend of the democrat and he had many friends among the navy men and he was very popular, and I thought he was the best man to improve and maintain peace between the two countries. And years ago, you know, when I was in SMR, one day I urged upon Admiral Nomura while he was in the Navy Office, to become Japanese Ambassador at Washington, which he refused. Moreover, he was a most intimate friend of mine from our youthhood.
- Q. What was the cause of his many friends in America and the high regard which you considered him to hold in America, that you considered him best suited to send at that time.
- A. His personal amiability.

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Def. Doc. # 613-A (4)

Projected

Excerpts from the Interrogation of MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

14 March 1946

- Q. Now, Article 3, "Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." Did that article give rise to any considerable discussion before the Privy Council?
- A. Yes, naturally.
- Q. Can you tell me, at least in substance, what was the nature of the discussion?
- A. Japan's taking part, for instance, immediately in the war, and I said that we understood after consultation it rested with Japan alone to decide whether to join or not to join in the war. And Germany and Italy equally had that right.
- Q. Yes, well this article here doesn't state in so many words that there shall be a consultation to determine this.
- A. I think either on the face of that treaty somewhere, or in a secret understanding.
- Q. There was that understanding?
- A. Yes.

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Def. Doc. # 613-A(1)

[illegible]

松岡洋石 戯問小説家
東京巢鴨拘置所における

Def. Doc. # 613-A(2)

Def. Doc. # 613-A(1-8)

一九四六年三月十一日（辯護側書證第六一三一A(8)）

問ではベルリンで行はれた會見では總統とフォン・リッペンと
の間になんか點で意見が一致しましたか。
答ベルリンでは私がはじめてヒトラーを訪問したとき、彼はすぐに
ガボールの問題の口を切りました。そこで私は敵談と虚勢のやりで日本
はドイツと同盟する前にシンガー・ガボールをとりあうだと言ひまし
かしそれは敵談だと言ひました。結局私はその問題を實際に言ひまし
たが、それは「事柄の意味を申上げ」るのです。日本がシンガー・ガ
をとるかどうかが、また何時日本がシンガー・ガボールをとるかといふこと
は日本のみが決定すべきであると言つたのです。するとヒトラーは
私が「言つたのは、それが大東亞内の問題でドイツには關係がない
ことだ」といふ意味を見てとりませんでした。そこでヒトラーは質問を打切つ
て、その問題には重ねてふれませんでした。フオン・リッペンとロッ
プはその際ヒトラーやその他の人々の前では何も言ひませんでした。

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としてその時はヒトラーがヨーロッパの戦況、特に西ヨーロッパの戦
 局の説明をするのに終始しました。ヒトラーもしくはフオン・リッペ
 ントロップを相手に私がアメリカとの戦争の可能性について論じたこ
 とは全くありません。

一九四六年三月十二日（辯護側書證第六一三A(8)）

問では野村提督はあなたが外相在任中に大使として合衆國に行つたので
 すか。

答私は彼に頼みました。が三ヶ月の間彼は拒絶しつづけました。しかし
 私の考へではワシントンに行くには彼が最適任だと思つてゐたので、
 それを主張しました。

問一九四一年の七月にあなたが解任された時もまだ彼はのちにゐまし
 たか。

答おました。

問何故あなたは野村提督がこゝした問題を處理するに最適任の人物だと
 考へましたか。

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彼は彼が民主黨の味方であり、海軍を人間に多くの友人をもち、大衆人望があるといふことを知つてゐます。だから私は彼が兩國間の國交改善と平和維持に最適任の人物だと考へたのです。御存知のように數年前、私が滿鐵にゐた時でしたがある日海軍省にゐた野村提督にワシントン駐在の日本大使になるように勧めましたところ、彼は拒絶しました。

言ひ尽しますが、彼は青年時代から私の一番の親友の一人でした。

間彼がアメリカに多數の友人を持つてゐること、アメリカで評判がよいとあなたも考へたこと、またその頃アメリカへ送るのに最適任だとあなたも考へたことの理由は何でしたか。

彼の和やかな人格です。

一九四六年三月十四日（海軍側書證第六一三△（四））

間ところで第三條にある通り、「ドイツ、イタリー、日本は前述の條件に關して協力すること」に一致する。更に右三國はその中の一國が現在

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Def. Doc. # 613-A(1-5)

歐洲戰爭もしくは日支事變に關與しをらざる國家により攻撃を受け
る場合にはあらゆる政治的、經濟的、軍事的手段をもつて相互に
援助を行ふものである。

この條項は樞密院會議で大いに問題になりましたか。

答當然になりました。

問その議論は、どんなものだったか、内容だけでも話していただい
せんか。

一九〇六年三月十四日（報）（辯論録卷第六一三—一四）

答たとへば日本が即座に參戰することです。そこで私は參戰するかし
ないかを決定するのは協議の上日本の意志によつてのみ決定するこ
とになつてゐると諒解してゐると言ひました。しかもドイツとイ
ギリスもまた同様にその權利をもつてゐました。

問さうです。さてこの條項はこの問題を決定するのに協議が必要であ
るというふことを其様に多くの言葉で述べておりません。

答その條約中のどこかかまたは秘密の了解事項にあつたと思ひます。

問そんな了解がありましたか。

答ありました。

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(2-1-A-2)

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Not used

Def. Doc. No. 613 - A (6-10)

(Excerpts from the Interrogation of MATSUOKA, Yosuke)
Sugama Prison, Tokyo

613-A-6

5 March 1946

(Page 14)

Q. The Tri-Partite Alliance was concluded by Imperial rescript also, wasn't it?

A. Yes. Not concluded, but the edict came out when it was decided to conclude it.

Q. You personally appeared before the Emperor and argued in favor of this alliance?

A. I explained.

Q. Did you say that you were opposed or in favor of it?

A. In favor of it. In the preamble of the Tri-Party Pact, the old Japanese tradition idea was included. The universal concordia or universal peace.

Q. But the theory was the Emperor of Japan would be the guiding influence?

A. No, not necessarily. Let each nation have its own place and right to work out its own destiny. That means universal concordia.

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6 March 1946

(Page 2)

Q. Did you, shortly after entering upon the duties of this office, have a conversation with the then German Ambassador to Japan, whose name was OTT, in which you then invited or welcomed closer cooperation with Germany?

A. Wasn't it General Ott?

Q. Yes, he was ambassador.

A. He called on me at my private house. The Foreign Minister always, when he takes up his office, sees all the ambassadors and ministers.

Q. That I understand, but did you tell Ambassador Ott at that time that you would welcome closer collaboration with Germany for your government? Did you tell him that?

A. Well, not exactly closer cooperation or collaboration. I said the same thing to Mr. Grew and others.

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Q. Well, what was the principal purpose of the question? What were you seeking to determine?

A. I wanted to know what Germany was then thinking about America, and her relations with America. Then I would determine the course of Japanese actions accordingly.

Q. And that was also true of the Russian Situation?

A. Yes.

Q. When Stahmer arrived here, early in September, he called on you?

A. Yes.

Q. There was already a German Ambassador here? General Ott

A. Stahmer was only Minister Plenipotentiary, without any post.

Q. Did he explain what his mission was?

A. General Ott accompanied him to my residence. I do not exactly recall how he said it, but he came to see the general conditions in Japan, and whether it was possible to conclude a treaty, and I told them to sit down, and I started my questions.

Q. What sort of a treaty did Stahmer want to conclude?

A. I think he wasn't very definite about it. Some close relation with Japan.

Q. Will you tell us more in detail what this first conversation was, that you had with Stahmer?

A. I will tell you - of course we spoke for an hour or two, and I don't recall now the details.

Q. You were anxious to make such an alliance, weren't you?

A. No, not particularly. That depended on the German answers. First, I asked Mr. Stahmer what was Germany thinking about America, and her relations with America. Now, I said that Germany was anxious to avoid any clash with America. I said now wait, from whom may I consider these words come from? Stahmer, without hesitation, replied that we might consider these words coming directly from Von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of Germany. Whereupon I proceeded to question him. The second question was what Germany as thinking of her relations with America after the war. He replied that Germany wished to be on friendly terms with America and it was silly - I think he said that it was silly - to think Germany would attack America, that Germany needs after the war the improvement of relations between Germany and America, and peaceful pursuit. I said all right, and then I said this - that Japan was anxious to improve and readjust the relations between Soviet Russia and Japan, and to get a neutrality treaty or non-aggression treaty. There were two treaties preposed for Japan and Soviet Russia. A non-aggression treaty and a new draft. They were already at the time taking up the matter. I was anxious to conclude one or the other. That is, in a word Japan desires to have a good close relation with Soviet Russia. Now, would it be possible for Germany to use her good offices between Soviet Russia and Japan and help Japan to do so - to accomplish the end - and Stahmer said yes.

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And some sundry things. And in the course of conversation, Stahmer expressed that Germany would also like Japan to end the Chinese thing now. I said that Japan is very anxious to end the Chinese thing. And so, that is about the main points. I reported to Premier Konoye and the War Minister and Navy Minister, and after that they told me to proceed with the conversation along that line.

(Pages 5 & 6)

Q. Can you say what were the principal consideration for this Tri-Party alliance? Why did you enter into this pact?

A. That is very clear in my mind. For many reasons. First, I never disclosed to anyone lest it might leak out and give hint to Germany. I was so dreading from my youthhood that first was to prevent by all means Germany from directing American students of German origin from carrying out anti-Japanese propaganda in America. From my study of your country, I was always afraid that there were among some American students of German origin that had some societies all over the country - amateur photograph societies, or art societies, or literature societies, etc. but they are all united, and Americans of these German origins could be used by an order from Germany, and I was afraid of this. So one day when it suits Germany, this American students of German origin might carry out propaganda aiming at an American-Japanese war, and if it was started, I came to the conclusion that we had no means to prevent it. We would be powerless. This had been hanging like a nightmare all through my young days in your country, and in every consideration of relations between America and Japan I never lost sight of this possibility. Now, by coming to closer relations with Hitler, I might prevent that. That is the first consideration. I was so afraid of it that I never disclosed it. Second, I wanted to limit the sphere of the European war, and to prevent its spreading to East Asia. That is second. And third, by coming into closer relations, I might gradually influence Germany to end the war, in cooperation both with America, and America influencing Great Britain. And fourth, that my final aim was from the start to approach America, but in order to do so you have to have some strong stand and approach your country with dignity and some strength. And then some other sundry considerations.

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I must tell you that past the middle of September I was one day almost on the point of breaking off. I had conversations with General Ott and Mr. Stahmer several times, and I was on the point of breaking it off.

Q. What was the understanding with respect to Germany, concerning this Tri-Party alliance? What was her purpose? Did they explain to you why they were now anxious to conclude this pact with Japan?

A. No, they don't say exactly. They said they wanted to come into closer relations with Japan.

A. And as foreign minister, didn't you inquire into the reason for that sudden desire on the part of Hitler's Government?

A. No. I put those questions, and I was satisfied with the answers, and satisfied that this pact would prevent war from spreading.

Q. Now, you visited Berlin, didn't you, and talked with Ribbentrop and Hitler, didn't you? Was that after the conclusion of the pact?

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A. Yes, it came about this way - on the day we concluded that pact, I spoke over the telephone with Von Ribbentrop and with Count Giano. They both invited me to visit them, and I said if the conditions were right, I may do so. So, later on I went out to visit Europe. But that again - in proper place I will explain.

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Q. Did you go first to Berlin, or first to Moscow?

A. I passed through Moscow, and so I stopped one day and paid my respects to Mr. Stalin, and then went to Berlin.

Q. In Berlin did you have conversations with Oshima?

A. Some casual conversations, but not on business.

(Pages 9 & 10)

Q. Did you have a person in your office, or particularly the Vice Foreign Minister, whose name was Ohashi?

A. Yes.

Q. If Ohashi should state that he called on the German Ambassador before you left to determine whether or not the German government would be interested if you stopped first in Moscow, would he be mistaken, or telling an untruth?

A. I don't know.

A. You didn't instruct him to do this?

A. No. May I put in a few words to clarify this? Although it is true when I said at the time that I should like to know the leaders of the German and Italian Governments and also the conditions of the countries concerned, as Foreign Minister - while it is true, yet I would not have gone out to Europe if those objects were all I had. They were used as a kind of camouflage to cover my intention of concluding a non-aggression or neutrality treaty, if I could.

Q. With whom?

A. With Soviet Russia. That was my intention from the start but I wanted to avoid the attention of the world to it. So I used Berlin and Rome as a kind of a camouflage, and so of course when I was going out I had to pay my respect to Mr. Stalin, so I paid, but I said nothing. When I was coming back, I think it was the night before I left Berlin, in a conversation with Von Ribbentrop, I said Japan was negotiating for a non-aggression treaty or neutrality treaty, and also we asked Von Ribbentrop to use his good offices and in a matter of course when I was on the way back to Tokyo, it was only a matter of course that he should take up that question. It was taken up all through by the Japanese Government with Soviet Russia, and then Von Ribbentrop said well you might better not do it; it is impossible to get it, the situation is such. He said it would be very difficult. Suppose I had a chance to concede it, and I might pick it up, and he said of course in such a case.

Q. It was agreeable to him?

A. Agreeable or not I don't know, but this is my supposition. I think Von Ribbentrop imagined that I would never be able to get it, so he said of course. And then I left Berlin and Mr. Stahmer, who was then in Berlin, accompanied me as far as the boundary. I told Mr. Stahmer that when I went to leave Berlin, tell Von Ribbentrop that I might postpone my departure by one train, and go to Leningrad where I was in my younger days, and I would try anyhow negotiations.

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And we parted and I said the same thing, not in so much detail, to the American Ambassador. He called on me at the Embassy - Mr. Steinhart. I said I will try to get this neutrality pact or non-aggression treaty. He also told me you can't do anything at present with Soviet Russia. It is very difficult. I said I think so too but if I succeed, America ought to welcome it as one more link for peace.

Q. What was the advice of your American Ambassador as to the conclusion of the Tri-Partite alliance, bearing on the Japanese relations with the U.S.?

A. He knew I was anxious to improve and maintain peace between the two countries, and that was two or three days before I left Moscow I asked him to wire out my words to the President and Mr. Hull.

(Page 11)

Q. How long did you remain Foreign Minister after the declaration of war by Germany upon Russia?

A. The second Konoye cabinet fell on the 17th, was it? Until that date.

Q. The 17th of what?

A. 17th of July. 16th or 17th. I was then already ill, you know. I didn't go to the government office.

Q. Did you notify the German Government that your Government did not contemplate an attack on Soviet Russia?

A. Yes. I handed a memorandum, the same memorandum to the Russian ambassador and German and Italian, on the same date. That was the early part of July.

(Page 13)

Q. Now, you said here you met Mr. Stahmer the first time early in September 1940, and by the 27th day of the same month, you had concluded with his government the Tri-Partite alliance, and at that time you didn't ask for two weeks, did you?

A. No, not two weeks. It was just Stahmer replied to my questions.

Q. Even in the ordinary course of events where all speed is necessary, it requires considerable time for the detail work of preparing such a thing as the Tri-Partite Alliance.

A. Yes.

(Pages 13 & 14)

Q. And you have stated here that you met Stahmer for the first time early in September, and that you had instructed Kurusu, your representative in Berlin, to execute the Tri-Partite pact on the 27th of September. But still, at this important liaison meeting you attended on the night of your return from Moscow, urging you for action in this matter - this proposal from the U.S. - you pleaded fatigue and asked for two weeks.

A. You must remember the Tri-Partite pact, there were no little details. This draft included so many details and big questions, such as Prince Konoye meeting the President at Honolulu and an exchange of the navy at Honolulu, etc., and so many grave details.

Q. All right, now interrupting here, please. You were well informed and had carefully studied long before you met Stahmer, the purpose and intent of the Tri-Party alliance. Isn't that true?

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A. No.

Q. When you executed it over this short period of time, you were well acquainted with the entire background?

A. No.

Q. It is your explanation now that on a matter of that seriousness, you met the man early in September and concluded the alliance on the 27th? Yet when this U.S. proposal is presented to you, you pleaded for two weeks time?

A. Yes, I thought it was grave enough.

(Page 15)

Q. In fact, the purpose of the Tri-Partite alliance was to neutralize the effect of the U.S. in the Pacific area? Wasn't that one of the considerations in your mind?

A. No. To neutralize Germany and Great Britain.

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7 March 1946

(Page 3)

Q. At the time you took over, what was the state of German-United States relations? In your general opinion?

A. That America was sympathizing and helping Great Britain with its war equipment, but I did not at the time think of America joining directly in the war, and Germany was trying its best not to come to a clash with America. That was my general observation at the time.

Q. Did you not consider, however, that the nature of the alliance, which was one of the first official acts of your government - the conclusion of the Tri-Party alliance - would rightfully lead America to the conclusion that it was your intention to cooperate with the Hitler or Nazi plan of aggressive warfare?

A. No. I didn't think in that way.

(Pages 11 & 12)

Q. Did you think, from your experience as a member of the Foreign Office and Foreign Minister of Japan, that the conclusion of the alliance with Germany, Italy and Japan at the time, and having in mind all that had then occurred in Europe, was conducive to an amicable condition from which you could realize your all-time desire to reach an agreement with the United States?

A. Yes, I thought of it this way - by concluding the three-party pact that would strengthen the Japanese position a little, and then with the preservation of the national dignity of Japan, then to the United States ^{showing our} sincerity I can gladly come to an understanding in the Pacific and get an agreement on China proper. That is the way that I thought it out - that this conclusion of the Tri-party pact might ruffle the feeling a little for some time, but showing our sincerity and friendliness we could gradually accomplish that. And after it was shown to you that even if we had the three-party pact, Mr. Hull and the President received us openhearted and negotiated those things. So it was not a dream altogether.

Q. On June 22 the German Government declared war upon Russia, didn't they?

A. At that time.

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Q. According to this, "Germany invades Russia June 22, 1941." Also Italy declared war upon Russia June 22 or 23. Do you recall that?

A. Not the exact date, but I do recall that sometime before that I sent word to Berlin, I think through Ambassador General Ott, to tell Hitler to forebear to go to war with Soviet Russia. I was against it. I do recall some of the words. I said "Even Napoleon made faux pas and you can't tell what the future has in store" and I strongly opposed Germany's going to war with Soviet Russia. And in that connection I must tell you, you know upon my return to Tokyo and reporting to the Throne and to the Premier about my European trip, I said that the relations between Soviet Russia and Germany were rather dangerous, although I still thought that it was maybe a bluff on both sides, that after all both sides might not go to war. Nevertheless it was dangerous. But I took care not to commit anything, and not to discuss the situation in Germany, and the Tri-Partite Pact did not oblige us to join the war.

Q. Therefore July 8 your government told the United States Government that it had not so far considered the possibility of fighting Russia?

A. Yes.

Q. According to this, on July 8 that announcement was made.

A. July 3 I think it was. I communicated the same thing to Russia, Germany and Italy's embassies.
(Pages 13 & 14)

Q. Why did the cabinet fail?

A. I don't know.

Q. Since you were one of the three or four persons originally in the formation of the cabinet that sat with Mr. Konoye, and two other of the leading ministers, and debated among yourselves the selection of the other members of the cabinet, you were in relation to the cabinet as a whole and the Prime Minister, such an important figure that you were in position to judge why the cabinet failed.

A. I was not then. Take for instance, this Hiranuma, a member of the cabinet. Konoye never consulted me and he apologized profusely afterwards. He did these things rather freely.

Q. It seems that the Konoye cabinet or government fell, that there was a rapid reorganization, and that you were the only minister who was eliminated from the cabinet. Is that Correct?

A. No. several others.

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d62d11/>

Q. May I ask you the direct question - was the fall of the then Konoye cabinet the result of a disagreement between yourself and your foreign policy and Prince Konoye as Prime Minister?

A. He says so in his memoirs, but no. You must know that he says once in his memoirs, but several times I told Konoye that if I stand in the way in any way about the negotiations if he felt so, I would resign at any time not to cause any inconvenience to him.

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A. (Cont.) And we were rather all very intimate on terms, and so I told Konoye privately whenever he thinks it best just tell me to resign and I will do so at once.

Q. I want to read from a document which for the present I do not choose to identify. The purpose of the reading will be to outline to you what apparently was the circumstances at the time, and I will ask you at the conclusion, or if you reach important points, whether or not you agreed with them. "During Matsuoaka's absence from Tokyo his opponents, especially the pro-Anglo-Saxon circles, tried to improve Japan's relations with the United States and with Great Britain, which had been neglected and had worsened since the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact." Is it true, or in your opinion do you believe that the relations between Japan and the U.S. had worsened since the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact?

A. Well, I have said that they may have a ruffled feeling somewhat, but my efforts thenceforth were to bring the two countries closer.

(Pages 15 & 16)

Q. Had you ever been urged by the German representative to request your government to enter the war against Russia?

A. No.

Q. So that if there is documentary evidence in the nature of dispatches between Berlin and Tokyo requesting such action, to wit: the going to war by Japan against Russia, they are either mistaken or false?

A. Fabrications. Of course Oshima, our ambassador, sent a wire asking what Japan will do. So we considered and decided not to join the war.

Q. Reading further, "The Japanese Government replied through Mr. Matsuoaka that it did not contemplate an attack against Soviet Russia. Indeed, with the exception of a few military hotheads, nobody in Japan wanted war against Russia. Press and public opinion were puzzled and confused by the sudden German attack on the Soviet especially after the much-advertised German-Russian non-aggression pact of October 1939. The Japanese government itself had just concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet. They had no actual conflict with Russia and considered Japan not prepared for such a war. Furthermore, it hoped to find an agreement with the United States in the China question which would be impossible in case of a Japanese attack upon Soviet Russia." Do you recall making such a reply to --- well, obviously, if no such request was ever made of you, you never made such a reply?

A. No. When Oshima wired out inquiring what should Japan do, I think he had it in his telegram that Hitler said whether Japan would join or not all depends on Japan and he is not asking for Japan to decide either way. Public Release under E.O. 13526 http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/doc/d62d11/ as I said yesterday, questioned Japan's help.

613-A-9
11 March 1946

(Page 4)

Q. Well now, Mr. Matsuoaka, why, at that time, did you consider that the non-aggression or neutrality pact with Russia was of such importance to your government?

A. That was my program from the start. It had been my contention for years to be on better terms with Soviet Russia.

0 164 0002 1875

Def. Doc. No. 613-A (6-10)

Q. Why was it so important at this time that you urged the other powerful member of the tri-partite alliance to use the force of their good offices to assist you in obtaining this?

A. I thought Germany was very close and on friendly terms with Soviet Russia, and had a chance to make use of their good offices. Let me complete what I wish to say. When I reached Berlin it was I who said to von Ribbentrop whether he could use good offices concerning the subject. Then he began to explain the situation, and concluded that it was impossible for Germany, in the circumstances, to do so.

Q. Why did you find it urgent and necessary at this period in the international relations of Japan to have such a treaty with Russia?

A. Well, that was my program, and after obtaining neutrality pact or non-aggression pact, there were two drafts, you know, so that I might after adjusting the relations with Soviet Russia, avail myself of opportune moment to go to the U. S. and talk with the President and Mr. Hull about the Pacific, and about the China problem.

Q. And did you consider that this non-aggression treaty was a necessary step before negotiating the Chinese problem with the U.S.?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. So if possible to enlist the aid of Soviet Russia also to our amicable settlement with China. And I must tell you, as I said the other day, that my visit to Berlin and Rome was largely a kind of camouflage, and my real intentions from the start when I was leaving Tokyo was to conclude the neutrality pact or non-aggression treaty with Soviet Russia.

Q. Very well. Was this not inconsistent with the principles of the anti-Comintern Pact, previously entered into by your government and Germany and Italy, and other nations?

A. No, I don't regard it so. And anyhow, the Anti-Comintern Pact was as good as dead then.

(Page 7)

Q. Now, since you found it so difficult over such a long period of time, you had even urged as you say, von Ribbentrop by telegram to use his good offices to assist in getting this treaty -- how do you account for the fact that in the final analysis you were able to conclude this treaty in a short period of time without, as you say, the good offices of Germany?

A. I think if I could see Stalin in person, I don't think I could ever have gotten that pact otherwise. I had two or three conferences with Mr. Molotov but I despaired. At the last, Mr. Stalin was to see me, and I talked straight with him and I reminded him that mine was not an improvised policy but that he perhaps knew I was working for more relations, better relations between Soviet Russia and Japan -- or, I should say between Russia and Japan because there was no Soviet Russia long many tens of years ago. That I had that policy for more than thirty years, and he knew it, this Stalin.

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d62d1>

Def. Doc. No. 613-A-(6-10)

(Pages 10 & 11)

Q. "Regarding the discussions between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister, in the presence of the RAM and the Minister of State, Meisner, in Berlin, 4 April 1941." --- do you recall that? April 1941 you had a discussion with the Fuehrer, the Foreign Minister of Germany, and one Mr. Neisner, Minister of State in Berlin.

A. I don't know the exact date, or Minister Meisner, who he is. I went to say goodbye and tender thanks to the Fuehrer before entraining for Rome, before I left Berlin.

Q. This was a conversation in which those persons above-mentioned and yourself were present. To refresh your recollection, I will read, "Matsuoka further mentioned that he was induced to make these endeavors for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal Gaspari. Furthermore, he had endeavored to convince the Pope that the U. S. and particularly the American President would prolong the war in Europe and China. It was not a question to determine if America and the President were right or wrong; they certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the reason, or right or wrong, one had to state the facts. In regard to China, he had tried to convince the Pope that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely Bolshevism, which threatened to spread in China and the entire East. It is regretful that America and England aided Bolshevism." Do you recall making that conversation? Reporting to them what you had discussed with the Pope or Cardinal Gaspari?

A. I don't discuss with Cardinal Gaspari, therefore there is no reason why I should talk about my conversation with him, but my conversation with the Pope, of course, I just carefully told Hitler that I projected myself to his Holiness and I sought his aid for peace, and I don't think I said that Great Britain and America aided the Chinese in Bolshevism. But I said to His Holiness I besought his Holiness the Pope to use his Catholic influence in improving and maintaining peace --- maintaining and preserving peace between America and Japan.

Q. Did you tell Hitler and von Ribbentrop and Meisner that, on 4 April 1941?

A. Well, whether I told it in such detail I don't recall, but I said more the purpose of calling on the Pope. I told Hitler. And also that I sought aid of his Catholic influence to induce China to come to peace with Japan.

(Page 26)

Q. What was the reason for your resignation?

A. That Konoye asked me to resign. As I have told you, I was thinking of resigning because of the things carried on behind my back.

613-A-10

12 March 1946

(Pages 1 & 2)

in

Q. Now, for the purpose of outlining to you, Mr. Matsuoka, what we will take up this afternoon, I will attempt to go again into your relations with Germany concerning the Tri-Partite Alliance, particularly your visit to Germany and Moscow in March 1941.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, did you receive any instructions from the Prime Minister, Prince, Konoye, concerning this visit which you made to Berlin and Moscow?

A. No.

0 164 0002 1877

Def. Doc. No. 613-A (6040-)

Q. Did you discuss your departure with him?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he have to say with respect to this trip?

A. He doesn't care to have an opinion about it, but he agreed to my visiting Europe and I told him I was merely making my visit to Berlin and Rome more a kind of camouflage in my attempt to conclude the Tri-Partite Pact or non-aggression treaty with the Russians, and otherwise improve the relations between Soviet Russia and Japan.

Q. Now, you mentioned the Tri-Partite Pact. Was that an error?

A. That was a mistake. I meant the neutrality pact. I have trouble sometimes to repeat those two treaties. Nevertheless, we had two drafts under discussion with our Ambassador at Moscow, and Mr. Molotov. That is why I always refer to two.

Q. What was the Prime Minister's attitude with respect to the conclusion of this neutrality pact with Russia?

A. Of course, he was for it. That is, from the beginning of his cabinet it was agreed upon, you know, between the Prime Minister and myself.

- 01 -

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d62d11/>

D. D. 61346-10
Def. Doc. # 613A-6

not used

(東京集鳴陸獄ニ於ケル松岡洋右ノ訊問ヨリノ抜萃)
千九百四十六年(昭和二十一年)三月五日

(十四頁)

問 三國同盟モ勅令ニヨリ締結サレタシタネ

答 ソウデス。勅令ニヨツテデハナイノデスガ、右同盟ヲ締結スル

コトニ決ツタ時ニ勅令が出タノデス。

問 貴方ハ自身デ陛下ノ前へ出テ同盟ニ賛成スルヤウニ論ジタノデスネ

答 私ハ説明シマシタ。

問 貴方ハソレニ反對スルト言ツタノデスカ ソレトモ賛成スルト言ツ

タノデスカ

答 賛成デス 三國條約ノ序言ニ日本古來ノ傳統的理念ガ含まレテ居マス

郎チ「ユニバーサル コンコウデア」又ハ「普遍的平和」デス

問 然シ其ノ理念ハ日本ノ皇帝ガ指導勢力トナルコトデスネ

答 必ズシモソウデハアリマセン 各國民ヲシテ自ラノ位置ニ立テソノ

運命ヲ切關イテ行ク權利ヲ得セシメルコトデス ソレハ「ユニバー

Def. Doc. # 613A-7

サルココンゴウデイア」ヲ意味シマス

千九百四十六年三月六日

(二頁)

問 貴方ハ當省ニ就任後駐日獨乙大使オット氏ト會談シ獨乙トノ一層

密接ナ協力ヲ勸導又ハ歡迎シマシタカ

答 ソレハオット少將ジヤナカツタデスカ

問 ソウデス 彼ハ大使デシタ。

答 彼ハ私ノ私宅ヲ訪問シマシタ外務大臣ガ就任スルト全大公使ト會

見スルノガ常デシタ

問 ソレハ分ツテ居マス 然シ貴方ハ其ノ時オット大使ニ貴國政府ニ

代リ獨乙トノ一層密接ナ合作ヲ歡迎スル旨申シマシタヤ、貴方ハ

ソレヲ彼ニ申シマシタカ

答 エ、必ズシモ一層密接ナ協力トカ合作トカ言ツタノデハアリマ

セシ。私ハグルー氏外ニモ同様ナコトヲ言ヒマシタ

Def. Doc. # 613A-7

問

換言スレバ貴方が今私ニ了解サセ度イコトハ貴方が申サレタ事ハ
 盟ニ各國ト協力スルトイウ一般のナ言辭ダツタトイウコトデスネ
 貴方ハソノ事ヲグルー氏ニモ言ツタノデスネ、貴方ハ貴國政府ガ
 獨乙政府ト一層密接ナ合作ニ入ルコトヲナツタト言フコトヲ特ニ
 ヒットニ證明シナカツタノデスネ

貴方ハ當時ノ駐獨日本大使來西氏ニ此ノオツト少將即チ大使トノ新
 ヲ知ラセマシタカ

答

イエ、知ラセマセン

問

此ノ御陳述ノ御話ノ直後 ヒットラー政府ノ特別密使、スターマー

答

ト云フ人が東京ニ到着シテ貴方ヲ訪ネマシタカ
 ソレハ大分後ノコトデシタ 同氏ハ九月上旬ニ私ヲ訪ネテ來タト思

ヒマス 日附ハハツキリシマセンガ上旬デシタ

(三頁)

答

貴方が今何ノコトヲ言ツテ御出デニナルカ分リマシタ私ガ就任シマ
 シテ間モナク其後何時デシタカ 獨乙ニ關スル凡ニル問題ヲオツト

Def. Doc. # 613A-7

少將ニ話シ同様ニ我駐獨大使來酒氏ニ無難シト思ヒマス ソシテ
 伯林ノリッペントロップヤ集ノ人達ガ私ノ問ヲ十分了解出來ズ終ニ
 スターマー氏ガ東京へ出掛ケテ來マシタデスカラ貴方ノ御尋ネニハ
 否トイフ外アリマセン
 貴方ガ伯林へ發シタ質問ノ性質ハドンナモノデシタカ
 ソレハ私が後ニスターマー氏ニ爲シタ質問ト大體同ジデス即チ獨乙
 ハアメリカカヲ如何ニ考ヘルカ 戰後ノ獨乙ノ態度ハドウカ或ヒハソ
 聯ニ關スル問題等デス
 デハ貴方ノ質問ノ重ナ目的ハ何所ニアツタノデスカ 何ヲ貴方ハ決
 メタカツタノデスカ
 竊ハ當時獨乙ガアメリカラドウ考ヘテ居ツタカ 並ニ獨乙トアメリ
 カノ關係ヲ知りタカツタノデス、ソシテ夫レニ依ツテ日本ノ進路ヲ
 決メタカツタノデス
 ソシテロシヤ關係ニツイテモ同様デアツタト言ハレルノデスネ
 ソウデス

Def. Doc. # 613A-7

問 スターマーが當地へ到着シタ時 九月初メニ貴方ヲ訪問シマシタカ
 答 ソウデス
 問 獨乙大使ハ既ニヨチラニ居ツタノデスネ オット少將ハ
 答 スターマーハ唯全權公使デアツタ丈デコレト言ツテ位置ハアリマセ
 ンデシタ
 問 彼ハ何ノ使命ヲ貴方ニ説明シマシタカ
 答 オット少將ガ彼ヲ私ノ宅ニ同伴シマシタ 私ハ彼ガ何ナ風ニ言ツ
 タカハツキリ記憶シマセンガ彼ハ日本ノ一般狀勢並ニ條約ヲ結ブコ
 トガ出來ルカドウカラ見ニ來マシタ ソシテ私ハ着席スル様ニ言ヒ
 私ノ質問ヲ始メマシタ
 問 スターマーハ如何ナル種類ノ條約ヲ締結シヤウトシタノデスカ
 答 彼ハソレニ對シテ餘リハツキリハシテ居マセンデシタ。何カ日本ト
 密接ナ關係トカ
 問 スターマーノ最初ノ會話ヲモット詳細ニ話シテ呉レマセンカ

Def. Doc. # 613A-7

答

オ話シマセウ 勿論我々ハ一、二時間話シマシタガ今詳細ハ思ヒ出
セマセン

問

答

貴方ハ斯様ナ同盟ヲ結ブコトヲ熱望シテ居ラレタノデスネ
イヤ、何モ特ニ、ソレハ獨乙ノ返答次第ダツタノデス、先ヅ私ハス
ターマー氏ニアメリカヲ考ヘテ居ルカソレカラ獨乙トアメリカノ關

係ヲ盡ネマシタ 私ハ獨乙ハアメリカトノドンナ衝突モ避ケ度イノ
デスネト申シマシタ。私ハ御待チ下サイ此ノ細言葉ハ何方カラ出テ
居ルノデスカト申シマシタ スターマーハ躊躇ナク此ノ言葉ハ直接
獨乙外務大臣リッペントロツプヨリ出テ居ルノダト申シマシタ ソ

6

コデ私ハ質問ヲ續ケマシタ第二ノ質問ハ戦後ノアメリカトノ關係ヲ
獨乙ハドウ考ヘテ居ルカトイフコトデシタ。彼ハ
獨乙ハアメリカト朝善關係ヲ望ンデ居ル ソシテ獨乙ガアメリカヲ

攻撃スル等トハ馬鹿ゲタコトダ確カ「馬鹿ゲタコトダ」ト言ツタト
思ヒマスソシテ戦後獨乙トアメリカトノ間ノ關係ノ改善並ニ平和ナ
目的ノ追及ガ獨乙ニハ必要ナノダト答ヘマシタ私ハ結構デスネト申
シマシタソシテソレカラ私ハ此ノコトヲ申シマシタ即チ日本ハソ聯

Def. Doc. # 613A-7

問

ト日本トノ間ノ關係ヲ改善シ遣リ直スコトソシテ中立條約カ不可侵
 條約ヲ結ブコトヲ切望シテ居ルコト日本トソ聯トノ間ニハ二ツノ條
 約ガ提案サレテ居リマシタ 不可侵條約ト今一ツ新シイ案デス ソ
 シテ此等ノ案ハ當時既ニ取上セラレテ居リマシタ私ハ其ノ何レカ締
 結シタイト望ンデ居リマシタ ソレハ要スルニ日本ガソ聯トノ親善
 關係ヲ望ンダカラデス玆獨乙ハソ聯ト日本ノ間ヲ幹施シソウスル爲
 即チ成就セシメル爲ニ日本ヲ援助スルコトガ出來ルカト申シマス
 スターマーハ出來ルト申シマシタ

ソシテ色々ナコトヲ話シマシタ 話ノ中ニスターマーハ獨乙ハ又日
 本ガ支那ノ問題モ早ク片附ケル事ヲ望ムト申シマシタ私ハ日本ガ支那
 ノ問題ヲ片附ケルコトハ大イニ望ンデキルト云ヒマシタ。ソシテコ
 レガ大體話ノ重ナ點デシタ私ハ近衛首相、陸軍大臣並ニ海軍大臣ニ
 報告シマシタソシテソレ以來彼等ハ此ノ線ニ沿ツテ話ヲ續ケル様ニ
 申シマシタ

此ノ三國同盟ヲ必要トシタ根本理由ヲ話シテ下サイ何故貴方ハ此ノ

Def. Doc. #613A-7

答

條約ヲ結ンダノデスカ

ソレハ非常ニハツキリ判ツテ居リマス色々理由モアリマスガ第一ニ私ハソレガ漏洩シテ獨乙ニ暗示ヲ與ヘヌ様ニ誰ニモ打明ケタコトハ無イノデスカ私ガ青年時代カラ縣念シテ居リマシタノデ先ツ第一ニ是非トモ獨乙ガ獨乙系ノアメリカ學生ヲアメリカニ於ケル反日宣傳ヲ爲ス様ニ指圖スルコトヲ防止シヤウトシタノデスカ私ノ貴國ニ於ケル勸學時代カラ私ハ縣念シテ居ツタノデスカ全米國ニ亘リ幾ツカノ結社ヲ有スル獨乙系ノアメリカ學生ノ中ニハ素人寫眞協會、美術協會、女學協會等ガアリマシタガ此等ハ凡テ統一サレテ居リマスソシテ此ノ獨乙系ノアメリカ人ハ獨乙カラノ一指令ニヨリ使用サレルコトガ出來タノデスカ私ガ熟レタノハ之レナノデスカ斯クテ一應獨乙ニ時到レバ此ノ獨乙系ノアメリカ學生ハ米日戰爭ヲ企圖スル宣傳ヲ行ウデヤウソシテ一旦ソレガ始マレバ最早之レヲ防グ方法ガ無イトイフ結論ニ立到ツタノデスカ我々ハ之レニ對シテハ無力デアツタデセウ之レハ私ガ若イ時貴國ニ居リマシタ間中惡夢ノ様ニ私ノ腦裏ニコビ

Def. Doc. # 613A-7

リ附イテ居リマシタ ソレテアメリカト日本トノ凡ニル關係ヲ考察
 スルトラスウシタコトノ可能性ヲ信ジテ疑ヒマセシタ ソレデ
 私ハヒツトラート親密ニナルコトニヨリ私ハ之ヲ防止スルコトガ出
 來ルカモ知レヌ 之レガ肝心ナ點デス私ハ餘リニモ之レヲ恐レテド
 ウシテモ明スコトガ出來テカツタノデス
 第二ニ私ハ歐洲戰爭ノ範圍ヲ制限シテ東亞ニ擴大スルノヲ阻止シヤ
 ウトシマシタ 是レガ第二ノ理由デス ソレテ第三ハ獨乙ト親密ニ
 ナルニトニヨリアメリカ並ニアメリカニ影響サルルコト大ナル英國
 ト協力シテ戰爭ヲ終結サセル様線々ニ獨乙ニ影響ヲ與ヘルコトが出
 來ルカモ知レヌ又第四ハ私ノ究極ノ目的ハ最初カラアメリカニ近ヅ
 クニトニアツタノデス然レソウスル爲ニハ或ル程度ノ強イ立場ヲ持
 タネバナラヌソシテ威嚇ト或ル程度ノ力ヲ以テ貴國ニ近ヅク要ガア
 リマシタ其他種々ナ理由カラデス
 尙御話致シ度イコトハ九月ノ半ヲスギテ私ハ殆ンド話ガ駄目ニナリ
 サウニナツタコトガアリマス私ハオツト少將並ニスターマー氏ト數
 回對談シマシタ ソレテ話ハ正ニ決裂ノ所ヘ來マシタ。

問	答	問	答	問	答
<p>此ノ三國同盟ニ關シ獨乙ヲ如何ニ考ヘテ居リマシタカ獨乙ノ目的トスルニトハ何デアリマシタカ、彼等ハ貴方ニ何故今日日本ト此ノ條約ヲ締結セシメイノカ説明シマシタカ</p>	<p>イエ、然ラトハ申シマセシ 彼等ハ日本ト一層親密ニ成リ度イト言ツタノデス</p>	<p>シテ外務大臣トシテ貴方ハヒットラー政府ノ側ニ於ケル此ノ突然ノ切望ノ理由ヲ訊キ質サナカツタノデスカ</p>	<p>イエ、私ハアアイツタ質問ハシマシタカ其ノ返答デ満足シマシタ</p>	<p>此ノ條約ガ戰爭ノ擴大ヲ防止スルコトデ満足シマシタ</p>	<p>ヒットラート話ワシタデシタネ ソレハ此ノ條約ノ締結後デシタカ</p>
					<p>ソウデス ソレハ大體コンナ風デシタ アノ條約ヲ結ンダ日私ハ電話デフォン、リッペントロップ並ニチアノ伯ト話ワシマシタ 彼等兩人ハ私ニ彼等ヲ訪問スル様招キマシタ私ハ都合ガツケバ御</p>

Def. Doc. # 613A-7

問 邪魔山來マセウト申シマシタソシテ後ニ歐洲へ出掛ケテ行ツタノ
 デス、然シソノコトハ改メテ一適當ナトコヨデ説明シマセウ
 貴方ハ最初ベルリンへ行ツタノデスカソレトモモスコーへ行ツタ
 ノデスカ

答 私ハモスコーヲ通過シマシタソレデ一日滞在シテスターリン氏
 ニ敬意ヲ表シ伯林へ行キマシタ

問 伯林デ貴方ハ大島ト話シマシタカ

答 雜談ヲシマシタガ用事デハアリマセン

問 貴方ノ役所ニコシナ人ガイマシタカ詳シク申シマスト外務次官ノ
 大橋トイウ人デス

答 居マシタ

問 若シ貴方ノ旅行前大橋ガ貴方ガ先ヅモスコーニ宿泊スルコトニ付
 獨乙政府ガ不満ニ思フカドウカ測ル爲ニ獨乙大使ヲ訪問シタト言
 ツタラ彼ハ間違デスカソレトモ噓ヲ吐イテ居ルノデスカ

答 サア、判リマセシネ

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問 答

貴方ガ指圖シタオデハアリマセンカ

イエ、ソレヲ明カニスル爲少ク言葉ヲ押ンデモヨイデセウカ

其ノ時私ガ外務大臣トシテ獨乙並ニ伊太利政府ノ首腦者及併セテ關係國ノ國情ヲ知リタイト言ツタノハソレガ事實デモ一實際ソレハ事實ニハ相違ナイデスガ然レ私ノ目的ガソレ丈ケナラバ私ハ歐洲ヘ出掛ケテ行カナカツタデセウソレハ私ガ出來レバ不可侵又ハ中立協定ヲ結バツトスル私ノ考ヲ隱蔽デモシ度イトイウ積リデヤツタコトデス

誰ト

問 答

ソ聯トデス、ソレハ最初カラ私ノ考デシタガ私ハ世界ガソレニ注目スルコトヲ避ケタカツタノデス、ソレデ私ハ一種ノ偽裝トシテ伯林トローマヲ使ツタノデス、デスカラ勿論出掛ケタ時ニハスタ一リン氏ニ敬意ヲ表スル必要ガアツタ譯デス、ソレデ敬意ヲ表シマシタガ別ニ何モ言ヒマセンデシタ、歸途、確カ伯林出立ノ前夜ト思ヒマス、フオン、リツベントロツブト對談申私ハ日本ハ不可侵協定又ハ中立協定ヲ交渉中ダト機シマシタ、ソシテ我々ハ又フ

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オシ、リッペントロツプニモ彼ノ斡旋ヲ依頼シマシタ 勿論私ガ
 東京へ歸ル途中交渉スルトシテデス 彼ガ此ノ問題ヲ取上ゲル義
 務ノアルコトハ當然ノコトニ過ギマセン ソレハ日本政府ヨリ
 ソ聯ト共ニ取上ケラレタ居ツタノデス ソレデ、アオン、リッペン
 トロツプハ申シマシタソシナコトハ、モヨイデハアリマセン
 カ、ソシナコトハ出来マセン情勢ガ許シマセン 彼ハ又ソレハ非
 常ニ困難デス ソレヲ締結スル機會ガアルカモ知レマセンガソウ
 シタラソレヲ捉ヘルトシマセウ 勿論ソウシタラ機會ガアレバノ
 コトデスト彼ハ申シマシタ

問 答

ソノコトニ彼ハ好感ヲ持ツテ居マシタカ
 好感ヲ持ツテ居ツタカドウカハ知リマセンガ之レハ私ノ想像デス
 ガ「フォン・リツベントロツプ」ハ私ニハソレガ出来ナイト考ヘタ
 ノデス、デスカラ「勿論。。。」「ト言ツタノデス、斯クテ私ハ伯
 林ヲ去リマシタ

當時伯林ニ居リマシタ「スターマー氏」ハ「現迄私ヲ殺ツテ呉レマ
 シタ、私ハスターマー氏ニ私ガ伯林ヲ去ツタラ「フォン・リツベ
 ントロツプ」ニ私ノ出立チ「汽車」延バスカモ知レマセン、ソシテ私
 ガ若イ時居ツタコトノアル「レニングラード」へ行ツテ兎ニ角交渉
 ナスル積リデスト言ツテ下サイト申シマシタ、ソウシテ我々ハ別レ
 マシタ、ソシテ私ハソナニ評シクデハアリマセンガ、アメリカ大
 使ニモ同ジコトヲ申シマシタ、彼ハ私ヲ「更館」ニ訪ネテ來マシタ
 スタインハート氏デス、私ハ此ノ中立協定又ハ不可侵協定ヲ結バウ
 ト思ウト申シマシタ、彼モ貴方ハ目下「ソ」ト何モスルコトハ出
 來ナイソレハ非常ニ困難ダト申シマシタ、私ハ私モソウ思ヒマスガ

問 若シ成切シタラ「アメリカ」ハ平和ノ鍵ノ一環ヲ増シタコトヲ歡迎
スベキダト申シマシタ

問 三國同盟ノ締結一對スル日本ト合衆國トノ關係ニ觸レタ「アメリカ」
大使ノ忠告ハドンナモノデシタカ

答 彼ハ私ガ兩國間ノ平和ノ増進並ニ維持ヲ切望シテ居ルコトヲ知ツテ
居リマシタ、ソシテ私ガモスコーチ去ル二、三日前デシタガ私ハ彼
ニ私ノ言葉ヲ大統領並ニ「ハル」氏ニ打電方依頼シマシタ

問 貴方ハ獨乙ガ「ロシヤ」ニ宣戰後ドノ位外務大臣ノ職ニ止マリマシ
タカ

答 第二次近衛内閣ハ十七日ニ倒レタツデシタネ、其ノ日迄デス

問 何ノ十七日デスカ

答 七月十七日デス、十六日カ十七日デス御承知ノ通り私ハ其ノ時既に
病氣デシタ

問 私ハ役所へハ行キマセデシタ

問 貴方ハ獨乙政府ニ貴國政府ハ「ソ」ニ對テ攻撃スル積リノナイコトヲ

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告ゲマシタカ

答

ソウデス、私ハ覺書ヲ渡シマシタ同ジ覺書ヲ「ロシヤ」大使獨乙、伊太利大使ニ同シ日ニ渡シマシタ、ソレハ七月上旬デシタ

問

貴方ハ「スターマー」氏ニ始メテ千九百四十年九月上旬ニ會ツタ、ソシテ同月二十七日迄ニ彼ノ政府ト三國同盟ヲ結ンダト言ヒマシタガ其ノ時二週間待ツテ吳レトハ言ハナカツタノデスネ

答

イエ、二週間デハアリマセン「スターマー」ハ只私ノ問ニ答ヘマシタ

問

非常ニ急チ要スル事件ガ尋常ニ違ンデモ三國同盟ノ様ナコトヲ準備スル細カイ仕事ニハ相當ノ時ヲ必要トシマス

答

ソウデス

問

所デ貴方ハ當所デ「スターマー」ニ始メテ九月上旬ニ會ツタ、ソシテ柏林ニ於ケル貴方ノ代表ノ來稿ニ九月二十七日ニ三國同盟條約ニ調印スル詔指令シタト言ヒマシタ、然シ貴方ガ「モスコ」カラル夜貴方ガ出席シタ例ノ件ノ實行ヲ督促サレタ——合衆國カラノ提

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答

案デス——重大ナアノ連絡會談ニ際シ貴方ハ疲勞ノ旨ヲ述ベ二週間待ツテ呉レト言ヒマシタ

問

三國同盟ニハ細目ハ殆ンドナカツタノヲ忘レナイデ下サイ、所デ此ノ草案ハアンナニ澤山ノ細目ヤ近衛公爵ガ大統領ト「ホノルル」デ會談スルトカ「ホノルル」デ艦隊ノ交談等大キナ問題及ビアンナニ澤山ノ重要ナル細目ヲ含ンデ居マシタ
マアオ待テ下サイ、貴方ハヨク消息ニ通ジテ居テ「スターマー」ニ會フズツト爾ニ既ニ綿密ニ三國同盟ノ目的ヤ意圖ヲ研究シテ居ツタ
ノデスネ

問 答

イ、エ

貴方ガコノナ短期間ノ後ニソレヲ調印シタトスルト貴方ハ其ノ全裏面ニヨリ通曉シテ居ツタ譯デスネ

問 答

ソナコトハアリマセン

アノ重大ナ事件ニ於テ貴方ハ九月上旬ニ其ノ人ニ會ヒ二十七日ニ同盟ヲ結ンダト言ツテ居ルジャアリマセンカ、ソレニモ拘ラズ此ノ合

Def. Doc. # 613A-728

衆國ノ提案ガ貴方ニ申達サレテモ貴方ハ二週間待ツテ呉レト歎願シ
タデハアリマセンカ

答

エ、ハ、私ハソレヲ由々シイ問題ト思ツタノデス

問

三國同盟ノ目的ハ實際ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル合衆國ノ勢力ヲ無ニス

ル爲ダツタノデセウ、ソレモ貴方ハ考ヘテ御居デダツタノデセウ

答

イ、エ、獨乙ト英國ヲ中立サセヤウトシタノデス

千九百四十六年三月七日

問

貴方ガ引續ガレタ時獨乙、合衆國ノ間柄ハドンナ状態ダツタト御考

ヘデスカ、貴方ノ概括的ナ御意見トシテ

答

「アメリカ」ハ英國ニ同情シテ武器ヲ供給シテ援助シテ居リマシタ

然シアノ時私ハ「アメリカ」ガ直接戦争ニ参加スルトハ思ヒマセンデ

シタ、ソシテ獨乙ハ「アメリカ」ト衝突シマイト全力ヲ盡シテ居リ

マシタ之レガ私ノ當時ノ概括的觀察デシタ

問

貴方ハ然シ貴國政府ノ最初ノ公式行動ノ一ツデアツタ同盟ノ性質上

三國同盟締結トイウ——ソレガ當然「アメリカ」ヲシテ貴方ハ「ヒ

Def. Doc. #613A-8

問 答

ツトラール」或ハ「ナチ」ノ侵略戦争計畫ニ協力スル氣デアツタト結
論サセルコトニナルトハ考ヘマセンデシタカ

イエ、私ハソシナ風ニハ考ヘマセンデシタ

貴方ハ貴方ノ外務省ノ一員並ニ日本ノ外務大臣トシテノ經驗カラ當
時歐洲ニ起ツタ凡ユル事ヲ知リツ、アノ時獨乙、伊太利ト日本ガ同
盟ヲ結ンデソレガ貴方ノ常時切望シテ居ラレタ合衆國トノ協定實現
テ可能ナラシメル親睦狀態ニ貢獻シ得ルト思ツタノデスカ

答

ソウデス、私ハコンナ風ニソレヲ考ヘタノデス——日本ノ立場ヲ多
少強化スル三國條約ヲ結ブコトニヨリソシテ日本ノ國家的威信ヲ維
持シソシテ合衆國ニ我々ノ誠實眞摯ナル點ヲ示シテ太平洋ニ於ケル
了解ニ至リ本來ノ支那問題ノ協定ヲ獲得シ度イト考ヘタノデス、コ
レガ私ガ考ヘ出シタ方法ナノデス、又私ハコウ考ヘタノデス、此ノ
三國條約ノ締結デ當分少シハ感情ヲ尋ウデセウガ我々ノ戰意並ニ友
誼ヲ示セバ徐々ニ道ハ開ケルトソシテ後ニ三國條約ヲ結ンデモ「ハル」
氏並ニ大統領ハ胸襟ヲ開イテ感ジテ笑レマシシアノ件ヲ交渉セラ

Def. Doc. # 613A-8

問 答

レタノハ貴万モ知ツテノ通りマス、デスカラソレハ全然空想デモナ
 カツタノデス
 六月二十二日ニ獨乙政府ハ「ロシヤ」ニ宣戰ヲ布告シタノデシタネ
 ソノ頃デシタ

答

コレニ依リマス「獨乙ハ千九百四十一年六月二十二日「ロシヤ」
 ニ侵入シタ」同様ニ「イタリヤ」ハ六月二十二日又ハ二十三日ニハ
 「ロシヤ」ニ宣戰ヲ布告シマシタ、貴方ハ記憶ガアリマスカ
 正確ナ日附ハ憶エテ居リマセン、然シ儘ト覺エテ居リマスガソレヨ
 リ前デシタガ私ハ「オット」ニ便チ通ジテダツタト思ヒマスガ伯林
 ヘ傳言シテ「ヒットラ」ニ「ロシヤ」ト戰爭スルコトヲ慎ム様言ツ
 テヤリマンタ、私ハ戰爭ニ反對ダツタノデス、私ハ其ノ言葉ノ中デ
 學エテ居ルトコロガアリマス、私ハ「ナポレオン」スラ誤算ヲ犯シマ
 シタ、先ノコトハ豫斷ノ限リデハ無イト思ヒマス「ト申シマシタ、
 ソシテ獨乙ガ「ロシヤ」ト戰フコトニ強硬ニ反對シマシタ、ソレニ
 就テ申シタイノデスガ御承知ノ通り私ガ東京ニ歸リ陛下並ニ首相ニ

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私ノ歐洲旅行ニツキ報告シテ「ソ」部ト獨乙ノ間ノ關係ハ危險トイ
ハザルヲ得マセン、私ハ未ダソレハ恐ラク相方ノコケオドシデ結局
戰爭ニハナルマイト考ヘテ居マスガ然シソレデモ危險ダト由シマシ
タ、然シ私ハ行事モ敢テセヌ候ニソシテ獨乙ノ事情ヲ論ゼヌ儀ニ氣
ヲ附ケテ居リマシタ、ソシテ三「條約ハ我々ヲ戰爭ニ參加サセルベ
ク餘儀ナクスル様ノコトハアリマセンデシタ

ソレデ貴國政府ハ七月八日ニ合衆國政府ニ政府ハ「ロシヤ」ト對フ
コトハ考慮シテ居ラヌ旨ヲ告ゲタノデスネ

ソウデス

之レニ依リマスト七月八日ニアノ通知ハ爲サレタノデスネ

七月三日ダツタト思ヒマス、私ハ同ジコトヲ「ロシヤ」獨乙、並ニ
伊太利大使館ニ通知シマシタ

何故アノ内閣ハ失敗シマシタカ

知リマセン

貴方ハ近衛氏外二人ノ重ナ關係ト共ニ台閣ニ列シタアノ内閣ノ抑々

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メ初メヨリ居ラレタ三、四人ノ一人デ他ノ關係ノ詮衝チ貴方ガタノ間
 デ討議シタノデスカラ貴方ハ内閣ニ關シテ全体的又首相ト關係ガア
 リマシタ、ソレデ何故内閣ガ失敗シタカヲ判断スル地位ニアル重要
 ナ人物ダツタノデセウ

答

私ハ其ノ時ソシナモノデハアリマセンデシタ、内閣ノ一員ダツタア
 ノ平沼ノコトヲ見テ下サイ、近衛ハ私ニ相談チシタコトハアリマセン
 ソシテ後刻アツサリ断リテ言フノデシタ、彼ハ斯ウシタコトヲ自由
 ニヤツテ居ツタ方デス

問

近衛内閣又ハ政府瓦解シ急速ナ改造ガ行ハレ貴方ハ内閣ヨリ退出チ
 喰ツタ唯一人ノ關係ダツタデセウ

答

イ、エ、數人アリマス

問

卒直ニ御尋ネシマスガ、當時ノ近衛内閣ノ瓦解ハ貴方並ニ貴方ノ外
 交政策ト首相トシテノ近衛公トノ間ノ意見ノ不一致ガ原因ダツタノ
 デスカ

答

彼ハソノ覺悟ノ中デソウイツテイマスガ違ヒマス、御承知願ヒ度イ

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ノハ彼ハ彼ノ覺悟ノ中デ一度ソウ言ツテ居ルノデスガ然シ私ハ近衛
 ニ數回、若シ私ガドウニモ交渉ニ付テ邪魔デアラナラ、ソウイウ風
 ニ考ヘルナラ私ハ彼ニ迷惑ヲ與ケヌ爲何時デモ辭職スル旨申シタコ
 トデス、ソシテ我々ハ寧ロ非常ニ親密ナ間柄ダツタノデス、ソシテ
 私ハ個人的ニ近衛ニ何時ナリトモ彼ガ適當ト思フ時ニ辭職スル義ニ
 言ウテ呉レ、バ私ハ直チニソウスル旨話シマシタ

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問	答	問	答	問
<p>私ハ或ル書類ノ中カラ讀ンデ見ヤウト思ヒマスガ差當リ私ハコレガ ドンナ書類デアルカ云ヒタクアリマセン、之レヲ讀ム目的ハ其ノ當 時ノ事情ガ外観上ハドンナモノデアッタカヲ貴方ニザツト御知ラセ シ度イノデス、ソレデ私ハ結末ニ當ツテ若シクハ貴方ガソレヲ認メ ラレルカドウカノ重大ナ點ニ到達シタ時貴方ニ御聞キシマセウ、松 岡ガ東京カラ不在中彼ノ反對者等ニ親アングロサクソン派ハ三國條 約ノ締結以來等閑ニ附サレ且惡化セル合衆國並ニ英國ト日本トノ關 係ヲ改善シヤウトシタードウデスカ貴方ノ御意見デハ三國條約ノ締 結以來日本ト合衆國ノ關係ハ惡クナツテ居ッタト御考ヘデスカ エ、私ガ申上ゲタ通り彼等ハ何カ感情ヲ害シテ居ッタデセウ、デス ガ爾後私ハ兩國間ノ近接化ニ努力シマシタ</p>	<p>貴方ハ獨逸代表カラロシヤニ對シ戦争スル様日本政府ニ要請スルコ トヲ促サレタコトガアリマスカ</p>	<p>イ、エ</p>	<p>デハ日本ガロシヤニ對シテ戦争スルトイツタコトヲ要請シテ居ルコ</p>	

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問 答

トヲ證明スル伯林東京間ノ急電トイツタ性質ノ證據書類ガアツテモ
貴方ハソレヲ間違カ 偽デアルト申サレマスカ

虚構デス勿論大使ノ大島ハ日本ハドウスルカトイウ電報ヲヨコシマ
シタ、ソレデ我々ハ熱議ノ結果戦争不参加ヲ決定シマシタ
先ヲ讀ミマセウ、日本政府ハ松岡氏ヲ通ジソ聯ニ對シ攻撃スル意圖
ナキ旨ヲ返答シタ、實際二三ノ血氣ニハヤル軍人ヲ除イテハ日本デ
ハ何人モロシヤニ對シテ戦争スルコトヲ欲シナカツタ

新聞並ニ輿論ハソレモ千九百三十九年十第ノアノ觸レ廻ツタ獨ソ不
可侵條約ノ後デ獨乙ガ突如ソ聯ヲ攻撃セルコトニヨリ全ク當惑シ混
亂シテ居ツタ、日本政府自體ハ正ニソ聯ト中立條約ヲ結ンダバカリ
デアツタ、彼等ハロシヤト何モ紛糾モナカツタソシテ日本ハ斯ル戰
争ヲスル丈ノ準備ガ出來テ居ラヌト考ヘテ居ツタ、刻ヘ政府ハ支那
問題デ合衆國ト協定シ度イト望ンデ居ツタガソレハ日本ガロシヤヲ
攻撃スルヤウナコトガアレバ不可能ナコトデアツタ、貴方ハソウイ
ウ返事ヲシタ覺エガナリマスカ若シソウイウ要求ガ貴方ニサレタコ

Def. Doc. # 613A-8 & 9

答

トガ無イナラバ貴方ハソシナ返事ヲシタ答ガナイコトハ判ツテイマ
スガ

イ、エ大島ガ日本ハドウスルカラ調バヤウト電報シテ来タ時ニ其ノ電報ノ中ニヒットラーハ日本ガ参戦スカドウカハ日本自体ノ問題ダト言ツタコト彼ハ日本ニ何レノ道ヲ選ベトモ願マヌコトラ言ツテ居ツタト思ヒマス、斯クノ如ク獨乙ハ私が昨日言ツタ様ニ日本ノ援助ニ疑ヲ懷ンデ居ツタノデス

千九百四十六年三月十一日

問

板松岡サン、アノ時貴方ハロシヤトノ不可侵條約又ハ中立條約カ貴

答

國政府ニドウシテソシナニ重大デアルト御考ヘニナリマシタカ

ソレハ最初カラ私ノプログラムダツタノデス、ソレトノ間柄ヲ良ク
スルコトハ永年ノ私ノ願ダツタノデス

問

ドウシテアノ時貴方ガソウシタ條約ヲ結ブ爲ニ三國同盟ノ協力ナ仲
間ニ斡旋ノ勞ヲ執ツテ賞ハネバナラヌ程ソレガ大切ダツタノデスカ

Def. Doc. #613A-9

答

私ハ獨乙ハソ聯ト非常ニ親密デ友好關係ニアツテ斡旋スルコトガ出
 來ルト思ヒマシタ、ドウカ仕舞迄言ハシテ下サイ私ガ柏林ニ着イタ
 時フオン・リツベントロツプニ此ノ件ニ付斡旋ノ勞ヲ執ツテ呉レル
 カドウカト言ツタノハ私デシタハソコデ彼ハ情況ヲ説明シ始メマシ
 タ、ソシテ事情斯クノ如クダカラ獨乙トシテハソウスルコトハ不可
 能ダト結ビマシタ

問

答

問

貴方ハ日本ノ國際關係主スル時機ニロシヤトスル協定ヲ結ブコトカ
 ドウシテソシナニ焦眉ノ問題デ必要ナモノダト考ヘタノデスカ
 エ、ソレハ私ノプログラムデシタソシテ中立條約又ハ不可侵條約
 ノ締結後御承知ノ通りニツノ草案ガアリマシタソレデ私ハソ聯トノ
 關係ヲ調整シタ後合衆國ヘ行キ大統領並ニハル氏ト太平洋及支那同
 盟ニツキ話ス積リデシタ
 ソレデ貴方ハ此ノ不可侵協定ハ合衆國ト支那同盟ヲ交渉スル前ニ必
 要ノ措置ダト考ヘタノデスカ

Def. Doc. # 613 A-9

答	問	答	問	答	問
ソウデス	何故デスカ	ソレハ支部トノ友好的解決ヘモソ附ガ一肌脱イデ呉レ、バト思ツタ ノデス、ソシテ日私ガ白上ゲタニ私ノ伯林並ニローマ訪問ハ多 分ニ偽装ノ意味ガアツタノデスソシテ私ガ東京ヲ立ツテ以來ノホン トノ様リハソ附ト中立條約又ハ不可侵條ヲ結ブコトニアツタノデス ヨロシイ、スルト之ハ貴國政府及獨乙、伊太利並ニ他ノ國ニヨツテ 結バレテ居ツタ反國際共產黨條約ノ原理ト矛盾スルコトニハナリマ センカ	イ、エ、私ハソウハ思ヒマセン兎ニ角反國際共產黨條約ハ當時既に 死傷ダツタノデス	概貴方ハソシナニ長イ期間ソレヲソシナニ困難ニ感じテオ出デデシ タノデ貴方ノ御仰ル通り電報デフオン。リツベトロツブニ此ノ協定 ヲ結ブコトヲ援助シテ欲シイト促シタノデス	デスガ結局貴方ハ此ノ協定ヲ貴方ノオ仰ル通り獨乙ノ幹旋ナリ短イ

答

期間ニ結ブコトニ成功シタノデスガソレヲ何ト設限ナサルノデスカ
私ハスターリンニ會ヒタイト考ヘマシタ、ソレ以外此ノ條約ヲ結ブ
方法ガアルトハ思ヒマセンデシタ、私ハモロトフ氏ト二三四會談シ
マシタガ希望デシタ最後ニスターリン氏ハ私ト會フコトニナツテ居
マシタ私ハ卒直ニ彼ト話シマシタソシテ私ハ彼ニ私ノ政策ハ一時ノ
間ニ合セイモノデナイコト彼ハ認ラク私ガソレト日本ノ間ノ關係ヲ
深メ改善スルコトニ努メテ來タコト（イヤ寧ロ、ロシヤト日本ノ間
ト言フベキデセウ何故カト言ヘバ數十年前ニハソレト言フモノハナ
カツタカラデス）私ガ三十年以上其ノ政策ヲ懷イテ來タコトニ注意
ヲ促シマシタ、彼此ノスターリンハソレヲ知ツテ居リマシタ

問

「總統ト日本外務大臣ガANDERSON及國務大臣マイスナー——立會ノ上千九百
四十一年四月四日伯林ニ於テ討論セル件ニ關シ——貴方ハソレヲ
思ヒ出セマスカ千九百四十一年四月伯林ニ於テ貴方ハ總統、獨乙外
務大臣及マイスナー氏トカ言ウ國務大臣ト討論シマシタ

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答

精確ナ目取又ハマイスナー大尉トハ誰ノコトカ知リマセン、私ハロ
ーマニ立ツ前ニ別辭ヲ述ベ伯林ヲ去ル前謝辭ヲ述ベル爲儀然ノトコ
ロヘ行キマシタ

問

コレハ上記ノ人達ト貴方自身カ出テクル會話ナノデス貴方ノ記憶ヲ
新タニスル爲ニマセウ、松岡ハ更ニ話シタ、私ハ特ニカーディナ
ルゲスバリノ人格ニ鑑ミ平和ノ爲ニ努力スル機氣ヲ進メマシタ、刻
ヘ彼ハ法王ニ合衆國特ニアメリカ大統領ガ歐洲及支那ニ於ケル戰爭
ヲ長引カセルデアラウコトヲ信ジサセヤウト努力シテ居ッタアメリ
カ及ビ大統領ガ正シイカ正シクナイカハ問題デナク彼等ハ彼等ノ政
策ニ對シ一定ノ理由ヲ持ツテ居タソナ理由如何ニ拘ラズ又正シカ
ロイガ間違ツテ居ヤウガ我々ハ事實ヲ述ベル要ガアル支那ニ關シテ
ハ法王ニ日本ハ支那又ハ支那自体ト戰ツテ居ルノデハナク陸軍ニ支
那並ニ全東亞ニ蔓延シヤウトシテ居ルボルシエビズムト戰ツテ居ル
ノダトイウコトヲ信ジサセヤウトシタ、アメリカ並ニ英國ガボルシ

Def. Doc. #613A-9

答 問

答

エビズムヲ援助シタノハ遺憾デアル。貴方ハ貴方ガ法王又ハカーデ
イナル、ゲスバリト討議シタコトヲ彼等ニ報告シテカラ會話ヲシタ
記憶ガアリマスカ

私ハカーデイナル、ゲスバリトハ討議ハシマセンソレデ彼トノ話ニ
付イテ話ス理由ガアリマセン然シ法王トノ話ハ、勿論私ハ慎重ニヒ
ットラーニ私ハ法王ニ私自身ヲ投ゲ出シ平和ニ對スル彼ノ援助ヲ求
メタト話シマシタ英國トアメリカガ支那ノボルシエビズムヲ援助シ
タ等トハ言ハヌ續リデ然シ私ハ法王ニ私ハ平和ヲ増進シ維持スル
爲ニアメリカト日本ノ間ノ平和ヲ維持スル爲ニカトリックノ勢力
ヲ用ヒラレンコトヲ御願スルト申シマシタ

貴方ハ千九百四十一年四月四日ニヒットラー、フオンリツベントロ
ツプ及マイスナーニソレヲ話シマシタカ
エ、私ハソレヲソナニ翻ニ話シタカドウカ思ヒ出セマセンガ法王
ヲ訪問シタ目的ヲモット話シマシタソシテ同僚カトリックノ勢力ヲ

Def. Doc. #618A-9810

持ッテ支那ガ日本ト和平ニナル様導クコトモ彼ニ御願ヒシタト彼等
ニ話シマシタ

問 貴方ハ何故辭職シタノデスカ

答 近衛ガ私ニ辭職スル機願ンダノデス此ニ御話申上ゲタ機ニ私ハ辭職
シヤウトシテ居タノデスソノ點ハ私ノ背後デ活躍スルモノガアツタ
カラデス

千九百四十六年三月十二日

問 板松同サン私ハ我々ガ此ノ午后取上ゲル問題ヲ貴方ニ大体説明スル
爲ニ三口同盟ニ對スル貴方ノ關係、特ニ貴方ガ千九百四十一年三月
ニ獨逸及モスコワ訪問シタコトニ觸レ座イト思ヒマス

答 承知シマシタ

問 板貴方ハ首相ハ近衛氏カラ貴方ノ伯林、モスコワ旅行ニ關シ何カ指

圖ヲ受ケマシタカ

問 貴方ハ貴方ノ出發ヲ彼ト討議シマシタカ

Def. Doc. # 613A-10

<p>答 問</p> <p>勿論彼ハ贊成デシタ、ソレハ既ニ組閣當初カラ御承知ノ様ニ首相ト私ノ間デ了解シ合ツタ コトデス</p> <p>此ノロシヤト・中立條約ヲ結ブニツキ首相ノ態度ハドンナ風デシタカ タノデス、ソレデ私ガイツモソノニツニ言及スルノデス</p> <p>スコー大使トモロトフ氏トノ間デ討論中ノニツノ草案ヲ持ツテ居ツ タノデス、ソレデ私ガイツモソノニツニ言及スルノデス</p>	<p>答 問</p> <p>今貴方ハ三國條約ト言ヒマシタネソレハ誤リデスカ</p> <p>誤リデシタ、私ハ中立條約ノコトヲ言ウ意リデシタ、私ハ時々アノ ニツノ協定ヲロニスルノガスラ、ト出来マセン、然シ我々ハ我モ スコー大使トモロトフ氏トノ間デ討論中ノニツノ草案ヲ持ツテ居ツ タノデス、ソレデ私ガイツモソノニツニ言及スルノデス</p>	<p>答 問 答</p> <p>シマシタ</p> <p>此ノ旅行ニ關シ何カ彼ハ注意スルコトガアリマシタカ</p> <p>彼ハソレニ付カレコレ言ウコトヲ好ミマセンデシタガ私ノ歐洲訪問 ハ贊成ダツタノデスソレデ私ハ彼ニ唯ロシヤト三國條約又ハ不可侵 協定ヲ結ビソノ他ソ聯ト日本ノ間ノ關係ヲ改善スベキ私ノ企圖ニ於 ケル寧ロ偽裝ノ伯林、ローマ訪問ヲシヤウト思ツテ居ルト申シマセ タ</p>
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Def. Doc. No. 613A/11

Not Used
(Excerpts from the Interrogation of HATSUOKA, Yosuke)
Sugama Prison, Tokyo.

12 March 1946

Q. Now, having in mind the essence of the meaning of the words non-aggression treaty, to whom or to which nation do you think the beneficial implication of this term non-aggression accrued? To Japan or to Russia?

A. Chiefly to Japan, because we would never encroach upon Russia. We would never be aggressor toward Russia.

Q. Well, it is true, isn't it, that back in 1937 or 36, or somewhere in that period of time, your government entered into a treaty or pact, so-called, the Anti-Comintern Pact, including your nation, Germany and Italy, and a number of other nations who subsequently joined in this Anti-Comintern Pact?

A. Yes. Italy, I think, joined later.

Q. Now, isn't it true that according to your testimony, or questions and answers made here yesterday, you made representation that in your visit to the Pope at Rome, and also that you restated your conversation with the Pope to Hitler, in which you outlined that Communism in the Far East, and its spread in China and Manchuria was the basis of the initiative taken by Japan in that area to stabilize her interests and that of the peoples of that region?

A. What initiative?

Q. The question now is did you not represent in your conversation with the Pope, when he requested that you do what you could to bring about peace, did you not say that the peace of the Far East was disturbed by the spread of Communism in the areas outlined in the previous question?

A. Disturbed, yes.

Q. What would you say?

A. We were trying our best to prevent the spread of Communism.

Q. Where?

A. In the Far East.

Q. And by trying to prevent the spread, what do you mean? What did you do or what did your government do?

A. We employed many means available.

Q. And it was these means that were under discussion when this representation was made to attempt to bring peace to the world, isn't that true? Now then, is it not true that the Japanese government and the Russian Government had a basis upon which Japan was opposed to the Russian Government as such in its initiative, so-called, in the spread of Communism in Manchuria and China. Is that true?
A. That is rather a positive question but this anti-Comintern was against Communism. It doesn't directly oppose Russia and Russia herself said that they were not distrustful of Communism. Soviet Russia and Communism are two different things. They themselves claimed and we never questioned about it.

PUH: <http://www.industry.org/doc/d62d11/>

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(松岡洋石訊問調書抜萃)

東京 巢湯刑務所

一九五六年（昭和二十一年）三月十二日

(問) 不侵略條約と言ふ語の意義の本質を思つてみて不侵略なる用語に含まれてゐる恩恵は誰に、即ちどの國家に現はれたと貴君は考へますか、日本にですか、それ共ロシアにですか。

(答) 主に日本にであります。何故なら我々は決してロシアを侵害する氣はなかつたからであります。我々は對露侵略者とならう等とは決して意思して居ませんでした。

(問) 一九三七年（昭和十二年）又は一九三六年若くはその頃の或る時期に、貴國、ドイツ、イタリー及び其後之に参加した他の一聯の國々を含む所謂「反共同盟」と云ふ條約又は同盟に貴君の政府は加盟

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したことは事實ですね。

(答) さうです。イタリーは後になつて参加したと思ひます。

(問) 貴君の證據或は昨日此處でなされた問答に依れば、貴君はローマ法王を訪問した際極東の平和維持に及ぼす共產主義の影響を強調したことを、又極東に於ける共產主義と中國及滿洲に於けるその積大が原因となつて日本及び同地域の諸國民の利益を保全する目的で石地域に日本が行動を起したものであると貴君が法王に告げた會話の内容をヒットラーにも繰返して述べたことを陳述したとありますが、事實ですか。

(答) どう云ふ行動の發起ですか。

(問) 今貴君に聞いてゐることは、法王との會話中平和を齎らす爲出来るだけの手を盡す様法王が要請した時貴君は前問に述べた地域に共產主義が擴がつてゐる爲に極東の平和が極き亂されてゐると言はなかつたかと言ふことです。

(答) 極き亂されてゐた、さうです。

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(問) 貴君は何と言はうとしたのですか。

(答) 我々は共産主義の擴大を防止しようとして最善を盡して居ました
(問) 何處で

(答) 極東に於てであります

(問) その擴大を防止しようと努める、とはどう云ふ意味ですか

(答) 我々は用ひ得る多くの手段を講じました。

(問) 世界に平和を招来しようとして企圖して斯様な陳述がなされた時は之等の手段が議論されてゐる最中であつた。さうではありませんか、それでは、日本政府とロシア政府とは一つの基盤を持つてゐたか、その上に立つて、日本はロシア政府に――率先して行動を起すものとしての、又所謂滿洲及中國に共産主義を擴大するものとしてのロシア政府に反對した、と言ふのは事實ですか。

(答) それはどちらかと言へば断定的な質問ですが、此の反共とは共産主義に對抗するものでありました。それは直接ロシアに反對するものではありません。ロシア自身彼等が共産主義を信用してゐると言

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つてゐる。ソヴェエツト、ロシアと共産主義とは異なる二つのものであります。彼等自身その様に主張し、我々も決してそれを疑つて居りません。

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したことは事實ですね。

(答) さうです。イタリイは後になつて參加したと思ひます。

(問) 貴君の證據或は昨日此處でなされた問答に依れば、貴君はロー
法王を訪問した際極東の平和維持に及ぼす共產主義の影響を強調し
たことを、又極東に於ける共產主義と中國及滿洲に於けるその擴
大が原因となつて日本及び同地域の諸國民の利益を保全する目的で
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(松岡洋石訊問調書抜萃)

東京

巢鴨刑務所

一九五六年（昭和二十一年）三月十二日

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REJECTED

Def. Doc. # 613-A-13

EXCERPTS FROM THE INTERROGATION OF MATSUOKA, YOSUKE

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

12 March 1946

Q. Now, did Admiral Nomura go to the U.S. as ambassador during your term of office as Foreign Minister?

A. I asked him and for three months he refused, but I insisted because I thought he was best man to go out to Washington.

Q. And was he still there when you left office in July of 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you consider Admiral Nomura the best suited person to deal in these matters?

A. I know him to be a friend of the democrat and he had many friends among the Navy men and he was very popular, and I thought he was the best man to improve and maintain peace between the two countries. And years ago, you know, when I was in SRR, one day I urged upon Admiral Nomura while he was in the Navy Office, to become Japanese Ambassador at Washington, which he refused. Moreover, he was a most intimate friend of mine from our youthhood.

Q. What was the cause of his many friends in America and the high regard which you considered him to hold in America, that you considered him best suited to send at that time.

A. His personal amiability. (Page 23 - 24)

14 March 1946

Q. Now, Article 3, "Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." Did that article give rise to any considerably discussion before the Privy Council?

A. Yes, naturally.

Q. Can you tell me, at least in substance, what was the nature of the discussion?

A. Japan's taking part, for instance, immediately in the war, and I said that we understood upon consultation it rested with Japan alone to decide whether to join or not to join in the war. And Germany and Italy equally had that right.

Q. Yes, well this article here doesn't state in so many words that there shall be a consultation to determine this.

A. I think either on the face of that treaty somewhere, or in a secret understanding.

Q. There was that understanding?

A. Yes.

(Page 16 - 17)

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

12 March 1946

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A. His personal amiability. (Page 23 - 24)

14 March 1946

Q. Now, Article 3, "Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." Did that article give rise to any considerably discussion before the Privy Council?

A. Yes, naturally.

Q. Can you tell me, at least in substance, what was the nature of the discussion?

A. Japan's taking part, for instance, immediately in the war, and I said that we understood upon consultation it rested with Japan alone to decide whether to join or not to join in the war. And Germany and Italy equally had that right.

Q. Yes, well this article here doesn't state in so many words that there shall be a consultation to determine this.

A. I think either on the face of that treaty somewhere, or in a secret understanding.

Q. There was that understanding?

A. Yes.

(Page 16 - 17)

REJECTED

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EXCERPTS FROM THE INTERROGATION OF MATSUOKA, YOSUKE

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

12 March 1946

- Q. Now, did Admiral Nomura go to the U.S. as ambassador during your term of office as Foreign Minister?
- A. I asked him and for three months he refused, but I insisted because I thought he was best man to go out to Washington.
- Q. And was he still there when you left office in July of 1941?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Why did you consider Admiral Nomura the best suited person to deal in these matters?
- A. I know him to be a friend of the democrat and he had many friends among the Navy men and he was very popular, and I thought he was the best man to improve and maintain peace between the two countries. And years ago, you know, when I was in SRR, one day I urged upon Admiral Nomura while he was in the Navy Office, to become Japanese Ambassador at Washington, which he refused. Moreover, he was a most intimate friend of mine from our youthhood.
- Q. What was the cause of his many friends in America and the high regard which you considered him to hold in America, that you considered him best suited to send at that time.
- A. His personal amiability. (Page 23 - 24)

14 March 1946

- Q. Now, Article 3, "Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." Did that article give rise to any considerably discussion before the Privy Council?
- A. Yes, naturally.
- Q. Can you tell me, at least in substance, what was the nature of the discussion?
- A. Japan's taking part, for instance, immediately in the war, and I said that we understood upon consultation it rested with Japan alone to decide whether to join or not to join in the war. And Germany and Italy equally had that right.
- Q. Yes, well this article here doesn't state in so many words that there shall be a consultation to determine this.
- A. I think either on the face of that treaty somewhere or in a secret understanding.
- Q. There was that understanding?
- A. Yes.

(Page 16 - 17)

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辯護圖書六一三一A一三

松岡洋右尋問審判筆

東京巢鴨刑務所

一九四六（昭和二十一）年三月十二日

問 さて、野村（海軍）大將は賈下の外相在任中に大使として渡米したので
すか。

答 私の懇請に對して彼は三ヶ月の間固辭して受けませんでした。私は彼
こそワシントンに出向くべき最上の人物だと思つたので、あくまで説得
したのです。

問 一九四一（昭和十六）年七月に賈下が辭任した時彼は未だ米國に居たの
ですか。

答 さうです。

問 何故かういふ問題を處理するには野村大將が最適の人物だと考へたので
すか。

答 私は彼が民主主義者の味方であることを知つて居り、又海軍關係に友人

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問

が多くその方の受けも非常によかつたので、私は彼こそ兩國間の平和を改善維持すべき取上の人物だと考へたのです。数年前、御承知のやうに、私が満鐵に居た頃、當時海軍省にゐた野村大將に或時ワシントン駐劄の日本大使にならないかと勧めたことがありますが彼は之を受けませんでした。その上彼は若い頃から私の一番親しい友人でした。貴下が彼こそ當時遣外使臣として最適なりと考へなりと考へたところの、米國に友人が多く又米國で非常に尊敬を受けゐた所以は何處にあつたのですか。

答

一九四六（昭和二十一年）三月十四日

問

では、第三條「ドイツ國・イタリヤ國及び日本は前記方針に於て相互に協力することを約す。更に締約國の何れか一國が現在歐洲戦争又は日支事變に關與し居らざる國の攻撃を受けたる時は、三國は政治・經濟及び軍事上のあらゆる手段を以て相互に援助すべきことを約す。」本條は樞密院でかなり問題となつたものではありませんか。

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問	答	問	答	問
	當然問題となりました。		その審議の模様を、大体だけでも話して下さい。	
		問	例へば日本は即時参戦するかといふ點です。私は、我々は協議の結果参戦するかしないかの決定は獨り日本にのみあり、又ドイツ、イタリ、兩國も同様の權利を有するものと了解してゐると述べました。	
問	是程、だが本條は之を決定するために協議を行ふべしとその言葉通りに言つてゐないか。			
答	それはどこか條約の文面中か或は秘密の了解の中にあると思ふ。			
問	さういふ了解があつたのですか。			
答	さうです。			

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Not used

Exhibit "_____"

Excerpts from Interrogation of MATSUOKA Yosuke

6 March 1946 (Page 4)

Q. Who was the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin at the time of the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact?

A. Mr. Kurusu.

Q. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Oshima worked diligently to conclude the Tri-Partite Pact or alliance, even before this time we are speaking of now?

A. I heard about it, but not in my time. He was not consulted at all by me.

.

Q. Now, you visited Berlin, didn't you, and talked with Ribbentrop and Hitler, didn't you? Was that after the conclusion of the pact?

A. Yes, it came about this way - on the day we concluded that pact, I spoke over the telephone with Von Ribbentrop and with Count Ciano. They both invited me to visit them, and I said if the conditions were right, I may do so. So, later on I went out to visit Europe. But that again - in proper place I will explain.

Q. Did you go first to Berlin, or first to Moscow?

A. I passed through Moscow, and so I stopped one day and paid my respects to Mr. Stalin, and then went to Berlin.

Q. In Berlin did you have conversations with Oshima?

A. Some casual conversations, but not on business.

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Q. So that if there is documentary evidence in the nature of dispatches between Berlin and Tokyo requesting such action, to wit: the going to war by Japan against Russia, they are either mistaken or false?

A. Fabrications. Of course, OSHIMA, our ambassador, sent a wire (asking) what Japan will do. So we considered and decided not to join the war.

Q. Reading further, "The Japanese Government replied through Mr. Matsuoka that it did not contemplate an attack against Soviet Russia. Indeed, with the exception of a few military hotheads, nobody in Japan wanted war against Russia. Press and public opinion were puzzled and confused by the sudden German attack on the Soviet especially after the much-advertised German-Russia non-aggression pact of October 1939. The Japanese Government itself had just concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet. They had no actual conflict with Russia and considered Japan not prepared for such a war. Furthermore, it hoped to find an agreement with the United States in the China question which would be impossible in case of a Japanese

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attack upon Soviet Russia". Do you recall making such a reply to _____ well, obviously, if no such request was ever made of you, you never made such a reply?

- A. No, when Oshima wired out inquiring what should Japan do, I think he had it in his telegram that Hitler said whether Japan would join or not all depends on Japan and he is not asking for Japan to decide either way. So Germany, as I said yesterday, questioned Japan's help.

12 March 1946 (Page 7)

- Q. Well, as Foreign Minister, didn't you usually take the advice of your Ambassador in these foreign cabinets, on matters like that?

- A. That depends upon the question. It is my principle not to discuss with Ambassadors anything he presents.

- Q. Well, he was sent to Berlin as a member of your Foreign Ministry when you were Foreign Minister.

- A. Yes.

- Q. But in any event to sum up the purpose of this question - Germany may have known in April when you were talking to them about concluding this non-aggression pact, that they had every intention of going to war with Russia,

- A. I doubt it very much.

- Q. But they did not raise any objection when you suggested you were about to conclude a non-aggression pact?

- A. No.

- Q. And you did conclude such a pact?

- A. Yes.

- Q. Now I assume that in your deliberation for the conclusion of this non-aggression pact with Russia, you were advised by other members of the cabinet?

- A. No.

- Q. Did you discuss the matter with other members of the cabinet?

- A. Not with all.

- Q. Did you discuss it with any of the members of the cabinet?

- A. With the Premier, Konoye, the Minister of War, Minister of Navy, and I think it included the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations.

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Q. Was the Finance Minister in on the discussion?

A. I don't remember.

Q. What was the nature of your discussions with these members of the cabinet?

A. I don't exactly discuss, but I told them that I was going to, and none raised any objection. In fact, they knew it was being discussed at Moscow between our Ambassador and Mr. Molotov for some time.

Not used

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辯護國側書證六一三—A—十四號（大島被告）

松岡洋右訊問調書から抜粋 昭和廿一年三月六日（四頁）

問 三國同盟締結當時のベルリン駐劄日本大使は誰でしたか、

答 來栖氏です。

問 實際問題として貴方は大島氏が今私達が話題にしてゐる當時以前に

三國同盟若しくは盟約を締結しようと努力したことを知つてゐますか。

答 その事について聞いた事はありませんが私の在任中ではありませんで

した。私は全然彼に相談しませんでした。

問 さて貴方はベルリンを訪問しましたね、そしてリッツペントロップや

ヒットラーと會談しましたね。それは同盟締結の後でしたか。

答 さうです。こんな具合でした。その同盟を締結した日に私は電話で

フォン・リツペントロップとチアノ伯と話をしたのです。二人共私が訪問す

る様にいはれ、そして私は事情が許せばさうするかも知れぬと言つた

のでした。そこで後になつて私はヨーロッパを訪問しました。しかし

この事については適當な所でもう一度説明したいと思ひます。

問 貴方は第一にベルリンに行きましたか、それともモスコに行きま

したか。

答 モスコを通過したので私は一日滞在してスターリン氏に敬意を表

してそれからベルリンに向ひました。

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問 ベルリンで貴方は大島と會談しましたか。

答 その場で思ひついた會話はしましたが事務上の事にはわたりませんでした。

昭和廿一年三月七日（六頁）

問 若しもこんな行動、即ち日本がロシアに戦争をしかけるなどといふ事を要求したベルリン東京間の電報といふ證據書類があるとしたらそれは間違ひか虚偽でせうか。

答 作り事です。勿論大島大使は電報で日本の將來の行動方針についてたゞして來ました。そこで吾々は考慮した結果戦争に参加しない事に決したのです。

問 續けて讀みます。『日本政府は松岡氏を通じて對ソ攻撃など考へてゐないと答へて來た。事實少數の恠急な草人を除いて日本の誰も對ソ戦を欲してゐない。新聞や輿論はドイツがいきなりソ聯を攻撃した事に味にそれがあの非常に宣傳された昭和十四年十月の獨ソ不可侵條約締結のあとに行はれただけに當惑し擾亂された。』

日本政府自体はソ聯と中立條約を締結したばかりだつた。ソ聯との紛争は實際なかつたし又彼等はそんな戦争に對する用意が出來てゐるとも考へてゐなかつた、更に日本政府は支那問題に關して米國との間に意見の一致を見出さんと望んでゐたのでありそれは日本がソ聯を攻撃

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した場合には不可能となるのであつた。」「
貴方は貴方にそのやうな質問がなされない時に（大島に）さういふ答
をした事をはつきりおぼえてゐますか。それともそんな答は全然しま
せんでしたか。

答 記憶がありません。大島が日本の今後の方針を電報でたゞして來た
時、その電報の中にヒットラーが日本の戦争参加不参加は日本の決す
る所で彼はどつちにせよといふのでもないと言つたといふ事があつた
と思ひます。で昨日も申した通りドイツは日本の援助が可能であるか
どうかを聞いて來たのです。

昭和十一年三月十二日（七頁）

問 さて外務大臣として貴方はかういふ問題に在外大使の意見をいつも
求めなかつたのですか。

答 それは問題によります。私は大使達がさし出したものについてその
人達と討議しないのを原則にしてゐます。

問 さて、彼は貴方が外務大臣在任中に外務省の一員としてベルリンに
派遣されたのですね。

答 さうです。

問 所で兎に角この尋問の目的を要約する意味で、ドイツは四月に貴方
がこの不可侵條約の締結について彼等に話をしてゐた時彼等がソ聯に

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戦をしかけるあらゆる計畫をもつてゐた事を知つてゐたかも知れませんね。

答 非常に疑はしいと思ひます。

問 しかし彼等は貴方が不可侵條約を結ぼうとしてゐるといふ事を示唆した時に別に反對しなかつたのですね。

答 しませんでした。

問 それで貴方はその條約を締結したのですか。

答 しました。

問 さてソ聯とのこの不可侵條約の締結を考慮する際に貴方は他の閣僚に助言されたと思ひますがどうですか。

答 いゝえさういふ事はありませんでした。

問 貴方はその問題について他の閣僚達と討議しましたか。

答 皆とではありませんでした。

問 では閣僚の誰かとはいふ事はありましたか。

答 近衛首相、陸相、海相とそれから参謀總長や軍令部總長ともしたと思ひます。

問 大藏大臣もその討議に参加しましたか。

答 記憶してゐません。

問 これらの閣僚達との討議はどよういふ性質のものでしたか。

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答 精密には討議しませんでした。しかし私等彼等に私が條約を締結
さんとしてゐる事を告げた所誰も反對しませんでした。事實彼等はそ
の問題がモスコで日本大使とモロトフ氏の間で相當期間検討されて
ゐた事を知つてゐました。